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This paper examines the relationship between tari¤s and antidumping (AD) within the
political economy of trade protection in South Africa. Using graphs, tables, panel data
regressions and an application of the Grossman-Helpman model I build an understanding of
the relationship between tari¤s and AD. Findings are that AD has increased with the
decrease in tari¤s. However this relationship is not a clear-cut substitution from one trade
remedy to another. The GH model suggests that both tari¤s and AD are determined within
the political economy. This nding is consistent for the whole period of investigation, from
1992 until 2009. Interesting to note; the data does suggest that governments goals when
setting trade policy have changed over time with social welfare entering the equation at some
point. However this is denitely not at the forefront of policy. Lobbying appears to be a
dominant feature in the South African market for trade protection. The importance of vested
big business interests in trade policy ensures that both tari¤s and AD are used strategically
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Under a new democratic government in 1994 South Africa undertook a period of rapid trade
liberalisation. Average MFN tari¤s fell from above 14% in 1992 to about 8% in 2001. At the
same time South Africa became one of the heaviest users of AD policy in the world. Between
1 January 1995 and 30 June 2002, 106 investigations were initiated by South Africa, 157 with
AD duties making SA the fth largest user after the US, EU, India and Argentina (Joubert,
2004). International evidence indicates that such a pattern of tari¤ reduction and increasing
use of contingent barriers to trade like antidumping (AD), countervailing duties and safeguards
has emerged in many countries around the world (Moore and Zanardi, 2008). While initially
intended as a measure to try and promote fair trade AD has degenerated into a tool for countries
to try and advance their strategic position over one another and thus AD is perhaps, currently,
the greatest barrier to trade (Blonigen and Prusa , 2001; Bhagwati et al., 1998).
Investigating this simultaneous reduction in tari¤s and increased use of AD is the primary
objective of this paper. From an initial glance the movement in tari¤s and AD suggests that
there may be signicant substitution from the one form of protection to the other. If indeed
AD is a substitute for tari¤s this could lead to one questioning whether certain countries
have liberalised their trade policy as much as previously thought3. Debate over the level of
liberalisation of South Africas trade policy is intense thus nding a relationship here contributes
to this debate and the wider literature of trade policy in South Africa (Edwards, 2005; Fedderke
and Vase, 2001).
There are obvious benets for governments to use AD as a substitute for tari¤s during periods
of liberalisation. Protection through AD will ease the political pressures faced by government
from domestic industries that are under threat from the increased competition (Moore and
Zanardi, 2008). Furthermore WTO legislation is formulated in such a way that there are a
number of loopholes. This loopholes allow countries to use AD in a strategic way and thus it
becomes rational to use it as a domestic policy instrument (Blonigen and Prusa, 2001)4.
The secondary objective of this paper is to use this tari¤ AD dynamic to study the market for
endogenous protection5. To achieve this goal I investigate the relationship between government
3This is fundamentally important particularly if the use of AD is on products where the use of tari¤s is
bound by WTO legislation because this could be sustaining tari¤ peaks, which are particularly costly to the
consumer.
4WTO ruling over AD usage has been relatively weak and certain countries have actually been able to
manipulate WTO antidumping legislation in their favour (Blonigen and Prusa, 2001).
5In this market government supplies protection and industry demands protection (Rodrik, 1995). Industry
desires protection so as shelter the market that it operates in and thus increase or protect its prots. Government











and industry during trade reform and uncover the determinants behind both partiesdecisions.
These determinants are of particular interest in a country like South Africa where there is
constant tension between the interests of big business, which drives South Africas economy,
and the millions of poor who live below the poverty line. Whose interests does government
consider when deciding on trade policy and how do they balance these interests?
This question is not only of interest in South Africa but the environment is one that lends itself
to such a study. Two reasons are identied below.
Firstly, South Africa has a strong history of industrial lobbying (Edwards and Alves, 2006;
Bell, 1997). This implies that the relationships and the interactions between government and
industries are signicant. Suspicions are that industrial lobbying continues to exist in a post-
apartheid world.
Secondly, in 1994 the African National Congress (ANC) government was democratically elected
and voted for by the majority of South Africans as opposed to the apartheid government who
represented a few specic interests within the country. This period of structural political
transition has had potentially interesting e¤ects on trade policy. Considering that the two
di¤erent governments had very di¤erent constituencies we may expect to see them impose
di¤erent policies in SA. Furthermore the composition of inuence from industry on government
changes; rather than only being inuenced by big business we may expect the ANC to be
inuenced by unions and industries that have preferred racial demographics. Thus the dynamic
through which industry e¤ects trade policy may be di¤erent depending on the time period or
trade protection tool that is being used. I investigate this through the use of disaggregated
cross-sectional data.
When analysing the government industry relationship the specic focus on AD has its own
particular advantages. While political economy factors a¤ect all forms of trade reform AD is
perhaps the most a¤ected. This is due to the legislative process that must be completed for AD
duties to be put in place; which includes applications, delegations, log-rolling and beaurocratic
government bodies and weak WTO law (Blonigen and Prusa, 2001). South Africa is no di¤erent
to other countries in this respect (Joubert, 2004).
Furthermore, studying both tari¤s and AD allows us to uncover information on the relationship
between government and industry that was perhaps not apparent before. Firstly, while many
liberalisation periods were exogenously driven by commitments to the WTO, AD cases are
endogenously formed by domestic industry applying to their relevant authorities (Bown and
from revenue, social welfare and votes relating to re-election. Government and industry interact in the market











Tovar, 2010). As mentioned above, there is a lengthy beaurocratic procedure and as such
interests that are central to the domestic country will come to the fore rather than exogenous
factors. Empirical techniques are used to try and determine whether the reform process has
been endogenous or exogenous.
The second advantage of AD is that by looking at AD as well as tari¤s ensures that vital pieces
from the South African political transition are included in the analysis. While ANC government
was part of the tari¤ liberalisation negotiations pre-1994 they were not yet in government. Thus,
they perhaps did not or could not implement all of their new policies, which were mandated
by the change in political constituencies, on the negotiations. However, since most of the AD
negotiations were conducted later on in the 1990s the new government was in power and thus
the ANC was able to implement their own social welfare considerations on the latter process.
Without the simultaneous use of both AD and tari¤s understanding of this relationship would
be di¢ cult.
In order to study the relationship between tari¤s, antidumping, government and industry I
implement two di¤erent estimation procedures. The rst is panel data regressions. The major
ndings from this section are that there is a strong relationship between tari¤s and AD in
South Africa. While AD has been used in response to a reduction in tari¤s and formula duties
in South Africa it is perhaps not a clear cut substitution relationship from tari¤s to AD. These
regressions also investigate the cross-sectional determinants of AD usage. I nd that aspects
such as a higher capital stock, less employees and more concentrated industries rather than
social welfare or racial demographics are signicantly related to AD protection. The second
estimation is the implementation of the Grossman-Helpman model. Following the methodology
of Bown and Tovar (2010) this procedure sheds light on the relationship between tari¤s and
AD as well as the political economy dimension in the market for protection. I nd that both
tari¤s and AD continue to be endogenously determined in the market for protection in SA
over time. This implies that the relationship between government and industry determines the
structure of tari¤ protection in South Africa rather than external factors and perhaps suggests
that AD is reinforcing the e¤ect of tari¤s. This strengthens the ndings of the cross-sectional
panel regressions. Together the results indicate that trade policy is being used strategically by











2 Tari¤s and Antidumping in South Africa
South Africa also has a long history of using trade policy to e¤ect output performance (Joubert,
2004). It has thus become a strong determinant of the performance and structure of the economy
(Edwards and Lawrence, 2008). In this section we review the use of trade protection in SA
and, using tables and graphs, conduct a preliminary investigation into the relationship between
tari¤s and AD. The tari¤ data is an updated version of Edwards (2005) tari¤ database6. AD
data is from the World Banks Global AD Database (Bown, 2010a). This database includes
information on imports which is disaggregated by country and year. Sales data is also used in
this analysis and is available from STATSAs quarterly manufacturing census.
Table 1: Decomposition of tari¤s in South Africa (Edwards, Cassim and van Seventer, 2009)
Under the apartheid government trade policy was characterised by the policy of import sub-
stitution (Edwards, Cassim and van Seventer, 2009; Edwards and Lawrence, 2008; Holden,
2002)7. However during the 1990s, both before and under the ANC government, South Africa
6The tari¤ database was constructed by L Edwards using tari¤ schedules from the South African Revenue
Services and government gazettes.
7While there was slight liberalisation during the 1970s when the government tried to diversify out of raw
materials the 1980s was a period of strong protectionism. Import surcharges and export subsidies were heavily











undertook a period of liberalisation8. Tari¤s were liberalised, 98% of tari¤ lines were bound and
the whole tari¤ structure was rationalised. This meant that the number of tari¤ lines dropped
from 12000 in the 1990s to 6420 in 2006 and specic, mixed, compound and formula duties
were replaced by ad valorem duties (Edwards, Cassim and van Seventer, 2009). Table 1 shows
the change in the composition of tari¤s during the 1990s.
Figure 1: AD use over time
Concurrent to the liberalisation in tari¤s there has been a large increase in the use of AD
measures. Figure 1 shows this; depicting the movement in a number of di¤erent ways. The
number of product lines which are a¤ected by AD cases, the number of AD cases and the
8Liberalisation under the ANC was more than many had predicted. In fact some of the liberalisation pre-
1994 by the apartheid government was motivated by fears over the possible protectionist policies that the ANC
would introduce (Bell, 1997). However post-1994 liberalisation increased and was a strong di¤erentiating factor











weighted proportion of products a¤ected by AD cases have all increased since 1992 reaching a
peak in 2002. Interestingly there has been a signicant decline in the use of AD duties since
2002. The two other series, which are at the bottom of gure 1, show the number of product
lines with new investigations opened in that period and the weighted proportion of products
which have new investigations in that period. These two graphs show that the number of new
investigations has been relatively volatile between 1992 and 2009 however there has been a
remarked decline in the number of new investigations since 2000.
One can now see that there is a strong negative relationship between tari¤s and AD usage in
South Africa. As tari¤s have been rationalised and decreased in their e¤ective protection AD
usage has increased. AD usage has not only increased but the duties are large and they account
for a signicant proportion of the rate of protection in South Africa. Figure 2 proves this by
graphing the tari¤ rate, the AD rate and the combined rate of protection. Two versions of
the AD rate have been included: in the rst version the average AD duty is calculated just
on those products which have AD duties, in the second version those products which dont
have AD duties are included in the mean and treated as zero. Version 1 (measured on RHS of
graph) shows us that the duties that are applied are large and thus they can be particularly
distortionary. By comparing the average tari¤ and the combined rate we can see that AD
increases the rate of protection signicantly above the tari¤ rate of protection.
While it is now established that AD duties contribute signicantly to tari¤ protection it is the
relationship between the two that we are interested in here.
Figure 3 shows that products which have AD cases have signicantly higher tari¤s on average
than the product lines which dont have AD cases. This could indicate that there has been
large liberalisation on the high tari¤ products leading to them being protected by AD cases.
However, looking at gure 3 we see that liberalisation has been relatively equal between the
two categories. This nding of more AD protection on products which are already protected
by tari¤s is contrary to our initial predictions that those products which have low tari¤s might
be protected by AD instead. This nding requires further investigation but it suggests that to
some extent AD duties are complementing tari¤s rather than substituting for them.
To give another perspective on this relationship I decided to look at it from two di¤erent angles.
First, gure 4A shows the proportion of products with AD cases divided into those products
which had high and low tari¤s between 1991 and 1995. The high tari¤ category includes
products were tari¤s where above the 1991-1995 mean and the low tari¤ category includes
products where the tari¤ where below the mean. There is a higher proportion of products with

































and suggests that there is a reinforcing e¤ect of the two trade remedies in South Africa.
Second, gures 4B and 4C show the proportion of products with AD cases divided into those
products which had high and low liberalisation between 1991-1995 and 1996-2002 respectively.
Where high liberalisation lines are those that have more than average liberalisation and low
liberalisation lines have less than average liberalisation. 3B indicates that those sectors which
experienced more liberalisation between 1991 and 1995 received slightly more AD protection.
However 4C suggests something di¤erent; that the AD is reinforcing tari¤s. Those sectors that
had little liberalisation actually received signicantly more AD protection than those which
liberalised more. These gures suggest that the South African case is not clear cut substitution
between tari¤s and AD as Bown and Tovar (2010) found in the Indian case9. Perhaps, when
compared to the India case, there are other factors which are coming into e¤ect in South Africa.
The second objective of the paper is to investigate how the cross-sectional composition of sectors
inuences the relationship between government and industry over trade policy. This is not only
interesting but will provide insight into what makes the results in South Africa di¤erent from
other countries.
Blonigen and Prusa (2001) note that the way in which AD law is constructed gives govern-
ment the opportunity to o¤er protection to preferred industries without blatantly violating
GATT/WTO principles. The fact that applications for protection are made on a case-by-case
basis in South Africa supports this idea that government can provide protection to politically
favoured industries (Edwards, Cassim and van Seventer, 2009). Thus when applications for
dumping duties come to the Board of Tari¤s and Trade (BTT), who must process the investi-
gations with limited resources, they are susceptible to lobbying or are inclined to o¤er protection
to certain industries (Holden and Casale, 2002).
In order to gain insight into whether certain industries may gain protection over other I outline
the sectoral distribution of AD cases in table 2. It shows that AD cases within the South
African manufacturing sector are highly concentrated, with the base metals sector being the
dominant user between 1992 and 2009 with 120 new investigations. Thereafter the vegetables,
chemicals, plastics, paper, textiles & clothing and non-metal mineral products sectors are all
relatively heavy users of AD measures. These sectors are also import in terms of output and
imports. Chemical products account for just above and base metals just less than 20% of output
between 1992 and 2009.
There are a number of sectors that did not have any AD measures imposed at all during the
9Bown and Tovar (2010) nd that there is substitution from Tari¤s to AD during Indias exogenous tari¤











Figure 4: Proportion of products with AD cases
10
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period; this can be seen from column one. Furthermore the duties that are imposed are quite
high. On plastic products they average up to a substantial 300% on the price.
Returning to the relationship to tari¤s we can see that the sectors with the highest levels of tari¤
liberalisation did necessarily get AD protection. The food, beverages and tobacco, footwear
and transport equipment sectors are good examples of this.
Table 2: Tari¤s and AD by sector
There is large variation across sectors in SA both in terms of protection coverage and eco-
nomic importance. The relationships apparent here encourages investigation into the tari¤ AD
relationship between sectors using empirical techniques.
3 Panel Data Regressions
3.1 Methodology
The panel data regressions unpack the sectoral distribution of tari¤s and AD, analysing the
relationship between the two. The main objective is to empirically prove that movements in
tari¤s are signicantly related to movements in AD; thereafter the cross-sectional determinants












ADi;c;t = 0 + 1TARi;c;t + jcontrolls+ i;c;t (1)
Where I use a dummy variable for AD which tells us whether or not a HS6 line has an AD
case against country i in year t. TARi;c;t is the tari¤ on product i in year t10; this investigates
whether movement in tari¤s are correlated to the movement in AD. Thereafter I include a
number of controls to ensure that the specication of the model is correct as well as to explore
the determinants behind AD cases in SA and establish whether there is a relationship between
cross-sectional industry di¤erences and levels of protection. While this regression analysis is an
atheoretical approach where we merely try to see the relationship between AD and tari¤s it is
important to ensure that the controls comply with theory.
There are four main factors that a¤ect the level of protection in a country: the benets to
government from awarding a lobby, the ability of an industry to lobby, the characteristics of an
industry that make them liable to receive protection and th social welfare considerations that
government takes into account when deciding on trade policy.
First, the benets that accrue to government from awarding protection are either through the
receiving of votes from a particular industry or through campaign contributions (Caves, 1976;
Baldwin, 1989). Both will in turn help them with re-election. I include information on the
number of employees in an industry in order to account for voters. Unfortunately campaign
contributions data is not available in South Africa. Thus this is a di¢ cult aspect to account
for. However, it is a crucial to the GH model and will be returned to in the work that follows.
Second, the ability of an industry to lobby for protection depends on how well they are organised,
their size and their concentration11. In order to account for this I include variables of rms
size and the four rm concentration ratio (Gawande and Krishna, 2003).
Third, there are characteristics that make certain industries likely to receive protection over
others. For example, exchange rate depreciation, ceteris paribus, decreases imports into a coun-
try which in turn decreases the likelihood that an industry may require protection 12(Blonigen
10TAR has been subscripted by c because the South African tari¤ regime also varies by preferential trade
agreement; EU, SADC or MFN. This does not make much di¤erence in the early 1990s because the preferential
agreements were not in place yet. However from 2000 onwards the tari¤ regimes do di¤er.
11There is wide literature which looks at the determinants behind industrial lobbying. Olsen (1965), Art and
Gilligan (1994) and Caves (1976) discuss the ability of concentrated industries to overcome collective action
problems and free riders in the non-excludable protection market through lobbying.
12Blonigen and Prusa (2001) argue that there are two di¤erent e¤ects of the exchange rate on AD inves-











and Prusa, 2001). Government may also be more likely to a¤ord protection to a sector which
experiences a sudden decrease in output because of the threat of job losses and closure (Olsen,
1965). I thus include information on exchange rate, imports and output in the regression
analysis.
Fourth, government might consider social welfare when determining trade policy13. It is well
noted that the ANC government has looked to address apartheids unequal distribution of
resources and in fact it is a goal of their trade and industrial policy (ANC, 1993; DTI, 2007). I
include variables like the ratio of black to white workers and the skill premium in the analysis
to probe these relationships.
3.2 Data
The AD, tari¤, trade and sales data are from the same sources as mentioned above (Bown,
2010a; Edwards, 2005; STATSA). An Industry level database14 and exchange rate data were
merged onto the AD, tari¤ and sales data to compile the full dataset which is at the HS6 digit
level.
3.3 Results
Since the industry data is only available in 1993 and 1996 I impose of two di¤erent specications
on the regressions; one without the industry data and one with it.
rms currency; which is the price which is used to examine dumping. Thus because there might be less than
immediate adjustment of prices the chances of a case proving dumping is more likely. The second e¤ect says
that ZAR depreciation decreases the import penetration which makes injury determination less likely. After
reviewing these two e¤ects it seems that the second is probably stronger in the South African case because the
rst e¤ect assumes that foreign rms price in terms of ZAR. While this might be true of the US it is unlikely
to be true of SA, a small price-taking economy.
13Typically in developed countries, governments have protected low-wage low-skill industries against compe-
tition from developing countries (Treer, 1994). In developing countries this relationship is less certain; there is
vast literature which examines this relationship of who indeed is losing from trade liberalisation. For a compre-
hensive literature of the social change aspect of trade protection see Caves (1976) and Gawande and Krishna
(2003).
14This industry level database was manually constructed from the South African Manufacturing Census
Surveys (STATSA ). It comprises of 150 HS5 digit manufacturing sectors available at the HS 4 digit level.
A concordance le was made to map the manufacturing data to Standard Industrial Classication (SIC) and
then to the HS data in order to make it compatible with the rest of the data needed for the research. This
database contains information on concentration, rm size, level of employment, output, racial demographics of












In the rst specication tari¤s, the real exchange rate (RER), formula duties, imports and
output are the explanatory variables in a regression where the AD dummy is the dependent
variable. Sales data is used instead of output data as the output data is also only available
in 1993 and 1996. I use a linear probability model (LPM) with industry product xed e¤ects
to control for the time-invariant e¤ects15. This regression was run for four di¤erent periods:
1992-2009, 1995-1995, 1996-2000 and 2001-2009.
ADi;c;t = 0 + 1Tariffi;c;t 1 + 2d_tariffi;c;t 1 + 3RERi;c;t 1 + 4d_RERi;c;t 1
+5formuladutiesi;c;t + 6importsi;c;t 1 + 7d_importsi;c;t 1
+8salesi;c;t 1 + 9d_salesi;c;t 1 + i;c;t (2)
16
The results are displayed in table 3. They suggest that tari¤ rates are strongly correlated with
AD measures imposed. All the coe¢ cients on the tari¤ variable are positive which implies that
the higher the tari¤ the more AD protection. The tari¤ coe¢ cients are signicant in all the
regressions other than the 1992-1995 period. In fact, many of the results for the period between
1992 and 1995 are inconsistent with theory; this is most likely due to the low number of cases
in this period and thus the small sample size for the regressions. The negative coe¢ cient on the
change in the tari¤ variable indicates that liberalisation is signicantly related to an increase
in AD protection. Together these results suggest that while tari¤ liberalisation corresponds to
increased AD protection, which does indicate substitution, there is a reinforcing relationship
between high tari¤s and more AD protection.
The real exchange rate has very little correlation with AD cases in SA; the only period where
there is a signicant result is between 2001 and 2009. This could be in response to the large
depreciation of the ZAR in the 2000 and 2001. The formula duty dummy indicates, as expected,
that reduction in formula duties is signicantly related to an increase in AD17.
Interestingly imports are not a signicant determinant of AD cases. This is unusual given that
15Apart from the size of the coe¢ cients there is little di¤erence between using a LPM to a probit in this case
because the probability of as AD measure being in place is very low.
16d_  is when the variable is in rst di¤erence form. Note that most of the variables are entered as a
lagged value; denoted by t 1. This helps to deal with the endogeneity with the regression (Holden and Casale,
2002). Furthermore it makes sense that industry characteristics transfer through to protection over time and
not immediately.
17In 1978 the Board of Trade and Industries (BTI), the body which oversaw trade remedies at the time,
decided that all AD measures would be eliminated and formula duties would instead be used to protect against
dumping. However formula duties were phased out by the WTO and thus during the 1990s South Africa began











increased imports give rise to increased competition which is likely to lead to domestic rms to
request protection. However it perhaps merely suggests that the BTT is not inuenced by the
actual level of injury from imports when deciding on protection outcomes. Decreases in sales
are related to increases in AD usage, as we would expect.
Table 3: Regression of AD cases over time
In the second specication the purpose is to check that the tari¤ relationship is consistent, and
to investigate the cross-sectional determinants of AD protection. In order to ensure that we are
looking at the industry characteristics correctly the estimation is separated into time periods
where the industry variables do not vary. Since the data here does not vary over time I cannot
control for the unobserved xed e¤ects and thus I run a probit model.
ADi;c;t = 0 + 1Tariffi;c;t 1 + 2d_tariffi;c;t 1 + 3RERi;c;t 1 + 4d_RERi;c;t 1
+5formuladutiesi;c;t + 6CR4i;c;t 1 + 7capitali;c;t 1 + 8employmenti;c;t 1











The results are displayed table 4. I nd that the tari¤ AD relationship here is consistent with
the rst specication. While it suggests that there might be some substitution from tari¤s to
AD the previous evidence that we have seen advices that this relationship is more complicated
than it was in India for Bown and Tovar (2010) because there is also a relationship between
higher tari¤s and more AD protection.
The results also suggest that sectors which are more concentrated, have higher levels of cap-
ital and less employment are correlated with higher AD protection. Initially I predicted that
protection might be related to higher levels of employment and a previous disadvantaged racial
composition within industries because of the social welfare aspect of trade policy. This was mo-
tivated from the policy commitment of the ANC and social welfare theory of trade policy (ANC,
1993; DTI, 2007; Ball 1976; Caves 1976; Gawande and Krishna, 2003). These results advocate
otherwise. The fact that capital and industry concentration are signicant may suggest that
big business continues to be powerful in the SA economy no matter the regime. However the
coe¢ cient on the ratio of white to black workers and ratio of skilled to unskilled workers does
suggest that protection is related to sectors which have a more black and or unskilled workers.
Thus there is some social welfare relationship but it is not as strong as the other relationships
found.
Interestingly, as predicted, results change over time suggesting that there are di¤erent forces at
play in the political economy of trade reform and protection in SA over time. This nding ties












Table 4: Probit regressions of AD cases in a cross-section - looking at correlations to industry
characteristics
3.4 Robustness Checks
In order to check that the results were consistent and that the tari¤ AD relationship is reliable
I made use of three levels of sensitivity checks.
First, all the regression were estimated using a di¤erent dependent variable. The rst AD
dummy tells us if there is an investigation on a particular line. The one used here is if there
is a duty in place, either preliminary or nal, on a particular product line. The rst approach
is used because it is well noted that the e¤ects of AD cases are not only felt when there is a
nal AD duty put in place (Staiger et al., 1994). Staiger et al. (1994) argue that there are
three non-duty e¤ects: the investigation e¤ect, the suspension e¤ect and the withdrawal e¤ect.
The results of these regressions are in the appendix as tables 10 and 11. The results from these












The second check changes the specication of the regressions with respect to the explanatory
variables. Rather than entering imports and sales separately they were entered as a ratio of
imports to output. This did not change the results signicantly.
Finally, to check that the results in the two di¤erent sets of results are consistent with each
other I run the second set using a linear probability model as well as the preferred probit model.
The results of these regressions are in the appendix as table 12. The results are once again very
similar to the results found above; the sizes of the coe¢ cients are di¤erent but this is due to
the specication of the model not a change in the relationship of the variables.
The sensitivity checks imply that the results are robust to changing of the dependent variable,
the specication of the explanatory variables and the type of estimation used; which strengthens
the outcomes.
The nding of a relationship between tari¤s and AD is a success. However, as has been noted,
it is not a clear cut one. This motivates the use of model which is theoretically consistent with
trade policy implementation worldwide. In the next section I use the GH model to deepen the
investigation into the relationship between tari¤s and AD. The estimation reveals information
of whether or not AD and or tari¤s are determined within the political economy of trade
reform. This sheds light on whether or not tari¤s and AD can be regarded as substitutes. The
estimation also continues to probe the political economy of reform in South Africa.
4 Grossman-HelpmanModel for Endogenous Protection
4.1 Review and Methodology
The GH model was originally built by Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994). Since
then extensive work has been done to apply it empirically. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) were the rst papers to conduct structural versions of the
GH model in the US. I follow their methodology as well as that of Bown and Tovar (2010) in
my estimation. Holden and Casale (2002) have estimated the Grossman-Helpman (GH) model
in South Africa. They conduct cross-sectional regressions using whether or not an industry is
successful in their application to the BTT as their dependent variable. This is relatively similar
to the rst estimation strategy that I used18.
18There has not been much work done on the GH model in SA. Margaret McMillan has also some work on











The GH model of endogenous protection is the one of the most widely used trade models.
Beginning from rst principles the model derives a set of testable predictions of the cross-
sectional di¤erences and determinants of protection; which are based on government industry
interaction (Bown and Tovar, 2010). It is intuitively appealing because the di¤erences should
be explained by merely three di¤erent variables; import elasticity, the import-penetration ratio
and whether or not an industry is organised (Goldberg and Maggi, 1999).
In this model there is a standard utility function in a multiple goods model and a Nash bar-
gaining game. Industries maximise their welfare subject to the loss of paying for lobbies.
Government maximises aggregate welfare and the contributions they get from industry. The





















ti: Level of protection in industry i.
ei: Import elasticity in industry i.
Xi: Domestic output of industry i.
Mi: Imports into industry i.
Ii: Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the industry is organised and equal to zero if it is not.




i. i is the fraction of the population that own a specic factor i. L is a subset of all the
industries in the economy; industries that are in L have lobby and are organised (Ii = 1).
19The error term, i, is not actually part of the rst order condition. It has been included here because this
same equation is the econometric specication.
Note: this is not the only specication that is possible for the GH model. For example the elasticity term
could be on the right hand side or the output import ration could have been brought to the left hand side. To
check for sensitivity I try the specication where the elasticity is entered on the right hand side; which is the











i: Random error term that accounts for what is not explained by the model.
The model tells us that if a sector is organised then protection is increasing in output and
decreasing in imports. This is because owners of the specic factor have more to gain from a
higher price and there is less to lose from protection if the volume of imports is low. Secondly, the
higher the import elasticity the lower the protection. This is because there is more deadweight
loss from protection when the import elasticity is higher (Goldberg and Maggi, 1999). The
theory thus predicts a negative sign on  and a positive sign on in the estimation that follows.
The next section briey reviews the data that is of specic importance to the GH estimation.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Tari¤s and antidumping
The level of trade protection in the economy is obviously of central importance to this paper.
I use measures of tari¤s, AD, ad valorem equivalents of th AD duties and a combination of
tari¤s and AD ad valorem equivalents. The database is aggregated to the 6 digit level and the
average tari¤ on each harmonised system (HS) 6-digit product is used a dependent variable
in the GH model. Ad valorem equivalents of the AD duties were constructed using the duty
specied by the ruling from each case. The AD database gives both a maximum and minimum
applied duties for each case; for sensitivity both of these levels were used in construction of the
AD ad valorem equivalents20. In order to look at the total level of protection in the SA economy
I summed the tari¤ and ad valorem AD duty together and used this composite measure21.
4.2.2 Industry Data and Elasticities
Output and industry organisation variables are obtained from the industry database, which
was described earlier. Estimates of the South African import elasticitys were constructed by
Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008) from the Wold Bank.
20Only the nal duties were used. Ad valorem rates overcome the problem of using coverage ratios, as pointed
out by Goldberg and Maggi (1999).
21This summation is possible because the trade, tari¤ and AD database varies by product, country and year.
Thus each AD and or tari¤ applies to a particular country and a specic import value and thus there is no need












As was noted earlier campaign contributions are likely to inuence governments decision in
granting protection. Furthermore they are a good proxy for how well a sector is organised. If
a sector is well organised it is more likely to be able to group together and o¤er up a campaign
contributions to government. It is for these reasons that campaign contributions data is one of
the crucial variables in the GH model and is usually used as the industry organisation variable
(Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000). Since this data is unavailable
in SA we follow Holden and Casale(2002) in using measures which explain what level of inuence
a sector may have on government to substitute for political contributions in the organisation
variable. Using di¤erent measures not only ensures that the estimation procedure is consistent
but it allows the invesigation of the changing political economy aspect of trade protection. This
is because by changing these organisation variables I am e¤ectively testing how government and
industry interact in market for protection and whether this is di¤erent over time.
Three di¤erent types of organisation dummy variables are constructed. First, concentration
ratios are used to construct a dummy variable with cut-o¤s at 60%, 70% and 80% levels of
concentration. All three of the levels are tested in the analysis. This variable should capture
the idea that concentrate sectors are more likely to organise and thus be able to politically
inuence government.
Secondly, principle component analysis is used to draw out the central information out of a few
di¤erent variables22. Two di¤erent versions of the principle component variable are used: rst
with the number of rms, the concentration ratio and the level of employment and secondly with
the concentration ratio, the level of capital and the share of unskilled workers. The motivation
behind these is that perhaps it is not just one factor that inuences governmentsdecision to
award protection to industry. As has been mentioned, there are four main drivers of inuence
of industry on government. This method captures a mix of those factors.
Lastly, the Department of Labour provided data from the bargaining councils in SA; which
includes information on unionisation from specic industries in South Africa. While this data
was highly aggregated and could thus not be used directly, a dummy variable was created which
indicates whether or not an industry has a bargaining council. This is a good representation
that those industries had an avenue to express their economic desires to government and thus
are more organised.
22Principle Component Analysis (PCA) is a statistical technique that allows us to derive the principle compo-
nentsfrom a number of di¤erent variables. Each principle component is the weighted average of the underlying
variables. The technique behind PCA uses eigenvalues and eigenvectors to choose weights which accounts for











In the GH estimation just the 60% concentration ratio dummy is reported. However the other
measures are used to verify the robustness of the results and investigate the political economy
dimension on the market for endogenous protection.
4.3 Estimation Technique
The dependent variable in the GH model is the level of protection in the economy and is
censored below zero. The explanatory variables, output, imports and in some cases elasticity,
are endogenously determined. Like Bown and Tovar (2010) an instrumental variables (IV)
Tobit two step procedure is used to deal with this endogeneity23. This entails using ordinary
least squares to regress both of the endogenous explanatory variables from the GH model on
a set of controls, then including the predicted values from this auxiliary regression in the GH
model as the explanatory variables.
I try to control for the factors which may a¤ect the level of imports and output in South Africa.
This includes: the number of employees and rms, the ratio of white to black workers, the
level of capital and output, the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers and concentration ratios.
When the concentration ratios are used as the organisation variable then they are not included
as controls. When instrumenting, both the level and the square of each term are included to
ensure that all of the structural variation is controlled for (Bown and Tovar, 2010; Gawande
and Bandyopadhyay, 2000 and Gawande et al., 2005). Due to constraints on the length of this
paper these rst stage regressions are presented in the appendix in tables 13, 14 and 15.
4.4 Objective and Strategy
The estimation strategy endeavours to help answer to the two main goals of this paper. The
rst part is to see whether there is substitution between tari¤s and AD and the secondary
aspect is to describe the political economy dimension of this relationship.
The strategy followed is similar to Bown and Tovar (2010). They conduct three main GH
estimations in their investigation of India. The rst is prior to liberalisation where, just using
tari¤s as the protection measure, the GH model ts the political economy of trade well. The
second regression is after signicant liberalisation. When using just tari¤s as the protection
measure the GH model does not t well. However when they use both tari¤s and AD duties
combined the model again ts the Indian data well. Bown and Tovar (2010) argue that this











implies that in the post liberalisation period India used AD as strategic domestic industry
protection so as to substitute for tari¤ liberalisation (Bown and Tovar, 2010). They conclude
that this provides evidence that there is substitution from tari¤s to AD in India.
To investigate substitution between tari¤s and AD in South Africa GH estimations are con-
ducted in a similar fashion; with both tari¤ and AD protection measures individually and then
again with a combined tari¤ and AD measure. I investigate whether the signicant liberalisa-
tion that was undertaken in South Africa in the 1990s means tari¤s are exogenously determined
in the political economy and whether AD becomes the endogenously determined trade remedy
which is substituting for the tari¤ liberalisation. The ndings are that there is no substitution.
This is because the political economy interaction between government and industry explains
the structure of both tari¤s and AD in South Africa.
The secondary, political economy dimension, goal is investigated in the sensitivity analysis
section. Di¤erent measures of the political organisation variable are tested in di¤erent periods
to see whether the mechanism through which government and industry interact is changing
over time.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Substitution between Tari¤s and Antidumping
The rst question here is does the political economy of trade explain the structure of tari¤
protection prior to liberalisation? I investigate this relationship in South Africa prior to sig-
nicant liberalisation by estimating the GH model in 1993. Thereafter I continue to apply this
same model to the periods after 1993 to see if the same relationship applies over time. This is
important because then we will know if the political economy dynamic for tari¤s is consistent
over time24.
The results, with tari¤s as the protection measure, are presented as table 5. It is important
to note a couple of things. Firstly, the formulation of this GH model causes the coe¢ cients
to be very small. To increase the output to import ratio by one unit implies doubling output
24The table shows the periods over which the regression is run quite clearly: in 1993, 1996, then again in
1996 but with the 1993 industry data. I impose a similar estimation for 1999 with 1996 industry data. Since
the Manufacturing Census data is only available for 1993 and 1996, from 1997 onwards I continue to use the
1996 industry characteristics. However the model is still estimated in 2004 and 2008. In these regressions, after
1996, sales data is used to proxy for output data. This is done purely because sales data is available after 1996
and thus allows us greater variation in the data. It can be seen on the LHS of the table that sales (sales) is











Table 5: GH models with tari¤s in di¤erent time periods
relative to imports which is a large amount. Furthermore the formulation of the dependant
variable, ti
1+ti
, causes it to be measured in small amounts itself. Thus the reader need not be
alarmed by the small coe¢ cients. Secondly, these results and those in output 3 and 4 use the
concentration ratio as the organisation variable. Organised industries are those that have above
60% concentration.
These results provide support for the GH model. The coe¢ cients in table 5 are generally of the
sign that expected; positive on the Ii XiMi variable and negative on
Xi
Mi
. This implies that more
organised sectors, or more concentrated sectors in this case, receive more protection in tari¤s
than unorganised sectors do (Bown and Tovar, 2010). This is consistent across the di¤erent
time periods suggesting that the political economy of trade protection explains the structure
of tari¤ protection over time. The sum of the two coe¢ cients is positive in all the regressions
which adds support to the model.
Finding that this particular model is consistent over time is contrary to what Bown and Tovar
(2010) nd in India during the 1990s. The results here suggest that tari¤s are not exogenously
determined in South Africa during the liberalisation period of the 1990s and 2000s. This point
I will return to later.











Helpman explains the structure of AD protection. Once again, I estimate this model in 1993
and multiple periods afterwards. These regressions show the relationship between government
and industry over AD over time. The results are presented below in table 6.
Table 6: GH models with antidumping in di¤erent time periods
During 1993 and 1996 the GH model ts badly. This could be due to the fact that AD
cases have not been put into use yet and thus there are few observations for the estimation.
Thereafter many of the coe¢ cients for the GHmodel are of the correct sign. However most of the
coe¢ cients are insignicant. This either implies that the political economy of trade protection
does not t the structure of AD protection across time very well or that there continues to be
a lack of data.
To investigate which of these options is true it is informative to conduct the GH model with
tari¤ and AD rates combined as the measure of protection. This estimation will show if the
government industry interaction in the political economy of trade protection can better explain
the combined rate of protection than tari¤s exclusively.
When both tari¤s and AD are combined together the GH model ts well. This implies that the
political economy of trade protection is explaining the structure of tari¤ and AD protection.
Most of the coe¢ cients are of the correct sign which implies that more organised sectors, or
more concentrated sectors in this case, receive more protection than unorganised sectors do. The
result is also consistent over time which suggests that the political economy of trade protection
is applicable and that it explains the combined level of protection in South Africa.
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Table 7: GH model with a combination of AD and tari¤s in di¤erent time periods
This set of three results suggests that, as expected, the South African situation is quite di¤erent
to that of the Indian. In South Africa the political economy explains protection throughout
the 1990s and 2000s; both when tari¤s and a combination of tari¤s and AD are used as the
protection measure. The GH model results advise that tari¤s are not exogenously determined
in any of the periods and that the model ts even better once AD duties are included. These
results seem to suggest that perhaps there was not particularly strong direct substitution from
tari¤s to AD but rather that they both being used as a strategic protection measure.
4.5.2 Sensitivity to di¤erent organisation dummies
The second goal of the estimation strategy is to investigate the political economy determinants
behind AD protection in South Africa; to examine whether business or social welfare factors
are driving decisions in the protection process and to test whether these relationships are stable
over time. This is done by testing whether the results are robust to changes in the organisation
variable which is e¤ectively changing the structure through which industry and government
interact.
For all regressions over all periods di¤erent formulations of the political organisation variable
are used in order to understand what is driving political organisation of industries within
the manufacturing sector in South Africa. As discussed earlier di¤erent levels of industry
concentration (60%, 70% and 80%), levels of unionisation and a combination of di¤erent factors











PCA variable are: rst with the number of rms, the concentration and the level of employment
and secondly with concentration, the level of capital and the share of unskilled workers.
Due to the space limitations I have only displayed the results for the three di¤erent periods:
1999 with 1996 industry data, 2004 with 1996 industry data and 2008 with 1996 industry data.
Furthermore I have only displayed the results for the regressions with tari¤s as the protection
measure. The complete results are presented in the appendix in tables 16, 17 and 18. They
conrm the same observations that one can make from the results in table 8 above.
These regressions indicate that the results are relatively robust to the choice of concentration
ratio; results for all three of the cut-o¤ levels, 60%, 70% and 80%, are signicant. However
the results are sensitive to change of organisation dummy away from the concentration ratios.
Neither the unionisation (bargaining council) dummy nor either of the principle component
analysis dummies is consistent. The signs of the coe¢ cients on these dummies variables change
frequently which is inconsistent with the theory. This result implies that unionisation is perhaps
not an important factor in political economy of trade protection and that perhaps trying to
combine the information from multiple sources so as to proxy for political organisation does
not work.
While this does highlight that the results are sensitive it is insightful that only by using industry
concentration as the structure through which industry e¤ects government am I able to get the
political economy of trade to explain the level of protection in South Africa.
4.5.3 Sensitivity to di¤erent specications
There remains some concern over the consistency of the results that have been displayed thus
far. Furthermore there has been disagreement in the literature as to what the best specication
is for the GH model. I thus test the other common specication of the GH model in order to
check whether the results are consistent and if they are sensitive to specication. The way in
which the results have been presented so far; where the elasticity is divided through on the
explanatory variables is the method advocated by Goldberg and Maggi (1999). The second
method is where the elasticity is rather multiplied onto the independent variables for the rst
step of the estimation (Bown and Tovar, 2010). In this second specication the elasticity
can also be instrumented for to control for the endogeneity. I control for it by using data
from Canada, Australia and Brazil as these are similar to SA in that there exports are largely
commodity driven. An average elasticity of the Canadian, Australian and Brazilian elasticities











A simplied version of the results has been displayed in table 9: just looking at the relationship
to tari¤s and no variation in the organisation variable. While there are coe¢ cients that are
insignicant in column 2, 5 and 6, on the whole these results are very similar to those in table
5. This conrms that the main results presented in section 4.5.1 are consistent. However they
are sensitive because many of the coe¢ cients do become insignicant which would imply that
the political economy of trade protection is not explaining the structure of protection in the
economy.
4.6 Summary of Results
These Grossman-Helpman results do not provide evidence of substitution between tari¤s and
AD. They advocate that both tari¤s and AD are explained within the GH framework for
endogenous protection and that, unlike to Indian case, tari¤s do not become exogenous to
the trade protection framework. This suggests that both tari¤s and AD are used strategically
within the South Africa economy to a¤ord protection to certain chosen sectors.
When using variables other than the concentration ratios the results are inconsistent with
theory. While this outcome does suggest that the results are relatively sensitive it also implies
that there must be something about the industry concentration that is consistent with the
political economy of trade protection in South Africa. This might relate to the strength of
industrial lobbying in South Africa.
5 Conclusion
SA undertook a trade policy transformation during the 1990s. Not only were there di¤erent
periods of trade liberalisation during the 1990s (WTO, EU and SADC trade negotiations) but
there was a political transition from the apartheid government to the democratically elected
ANC. This provides an interesting political economy framework. The result for South Africas
trade regime from this period of transformation was a dramatic decline in the use of tari¤s and
an increase in the use of AD. In this paper I investigate whether there is relationship between
this movement in tari¤s and AD. Additionally I consider whether the period of transition has
implications for trade policy which historically is dominated by the interests of big business.
I nd that there is a strong relationship between the AD and tari¤s in South Africa, panel
data regressions provide evidence of this. However from closer investigation of the South Africa











protection to the other. There is a complementary relationship between tari¤s and AD in that
AD is perhaps being used to reinforce tari¤ protection. Furthermore the panel data regressions
show that higher tari¤s and higher liberalisation are both signicantly related to higher levels
of AD protection. Thus while there has been movement from tari¤s to AD it does appear that
there is direct substitution from one to other.
Findings from the GH model are consistent with the panel data regressions. The results suggest
that AD is not used as a substitute for tari¤s.. Rather that the domestic political economy
factors explain the structure of both tari¤s and AD in South Africa. This implies that both
tari¤s and AD are being used to o¤er protection to strategic sectors.
The secondary goal of this paper, the investigation of the political economy relationship of
trade reform, provides an interesting accompaniment to the tari¤ AD examination. While it
was expected that the change of government and of political constituency might inuence the
political economy dynamic this is not the case in South Africa. Panel data regressions hinted
that a higher the level of capital, lower level of employment and higher concentration are more
related to higher AD protection. It must be noted that ther was some variation in the results
over time and that a few social welfare determinants did pick up some levels of signicance, like
the number of black and unskilled workers. However these social welfare aspects were certainly
not the crucial factors which were related to AD protection. Rather the panel data regression
results lean towards the idea that big business lobbies for trade protection in South Africa.
This idea is conrmed by the ndings of the GH model because concentration is the only form
of organisation that induces the political economy factors to explain the structure of protection
to any reasonable standard. Furthermore the fact that the political economy factors in South
Africa explain the structure of both tari¤ and AD protection suggests that there is a consistent
mechanism which is explaining the political economy of trade protection in South Africa over
time, namely concentrated industries. This result suggests that industry is lobbying as usual
for protection in the South African political economy of trade.
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Table 9: GH model checking sensitivity to di¤erent specications
Table 10: LPM of AD cases with di¤erent dependent variable (similar to table 3)
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Table 13: First Stage Regressions
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Table 14: First Stage Regressions
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Table 17: GH model with AD - with di¤erent organisation dummies to check investigate the











Table 18: GH model with AD and tari¤s combined - with di¤erent organisation dummies to
check investigate the changing political economy of protection (additional information for table
8
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